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Since the early days of Ockhamist semantics, it has been recognized that
the history-relative notion of truth which the theory postulates is prob-
lematic: it is unclear what it means that a sentence is true relative to a
possible course of events; it is also unclear how such a notion of relative
truth relates to the everyday notion of truth simpliciter. To rationalize the
Ockhamist notion of truth I compare two relativistic theories: the assess-
ment relativism of John MacFarlane and the history relativism of Belnap
et al. In the end, I suggest that wemay understand the history-relative no-
tion of truth as the truth assessed relative to an end of time. On the formal
level, I introduce a doomsday extension of a branching model and prove
that history-relative truth in any given model is equivalent to doomsday-
relative truth in the extended model. It turns out that this equivalence
holds in general only if the end of time is also, in a sense, beyond time.
Keywords: Ockhamism, assessment relativism, branching time.
1 Introduction
With the publication of “Past, Present and Future” the branching-time
model was incorporated into the mainstream of temporal logic. The
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model introduced an important modal dimension to the discussion of
time as it is based on the insight that the future, as opposed to the past, is
open to multiple realizations. Nonetheless, Prior himself did not dwell
on the metaphysical significance of the model because his main objec-
tivewas to understand (and undermine) themain arguments for logical
determinism. Thus, he immediately put the branching model to seman-
tic work to show that some assumptiomps postulated by determinists
are questionable and can be falsified in certain semantic theories. One
of these theories is Ockhamism (this model helped Prior to show that
not every sentence in the past tense truly concerns the settled past).
Ockhamist semantics is a simple and formally appealing theory that
smoothly blends past, present, and future tenseswith temporal possibil-
ity. However, there is certain controversy surrounding this semantics,
as the basic Ockhamist notion of truth eludes clear comprehension [this
concern was first clearly articulated in 11, pp. 270–1]. A few definitions
are required to understand this problematic issue.
Definition 1 (Branching Structure). Branching structure𝔅 is an ordered
pair ⟨𝑀,<⟩, where 𝑀 ≠ ∅ and ≤ is a partial order on 𝑀 that satisfies
the following conditions:
Backward linearity
∀𝑚1,𝑚2,𝑚3((𝑚1 ≤ 𝑚3 &𝑚2 ≤ 𝑚3) ⇒ (𝑚1 ≤ 𝑚2 or 𝑚2 ≤ 𝑚1));
Connectedness ∀𝑚1,𝑚2∃𝑚3 (𝑚3 ≤ 𝑚1 &𝑚3 ≤ 𝑚2).
The structure represents all the possible ways the system (e.g. our
world) might develop. Any one of the possible paths is called a history
(it is a maximal, linearly ordered subset of 𝑀 , sometimes also described
as a “chronicle” or a “branch”).
To define an Ockhamist model based on a branching strucute we
use a very simple, sentential language containing operators of classical
logic, two temporal operators, (‘it will be the case that’—𝐹—and ‘it was
the case that’—𝑃 ), and an operator of historical modality (‘It is settled
that’—2)1 .
Branching model 𝔐, based on a structure 𝔅, is a pair 𝔐 ≔ ⟨𝔅,𝑉 ⟩,
where 𝑉 is a valuation function which assigns a set of moments to ev-
ery sentential constant, 𝑉 ∶ 𝐴𝑡𝑜𝑚 ↦ ℘(𝑀). In Ockhamism, sentences
1The necessity operator is sometimes read as “it is inevitable that,” or “it is unpre-
ventable that.”
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are evaluated in a branching model at an index which contains two pa-
rameters: a moment parameter (shifted by temporal operators) and a
history parameter (shifted by the modal operator). Consequently, sen-
tences are evaluated at triples ⟨𝔐,𝑚/ℎ⟩. The Ockhamist truth (⊧) of a
sentence in a model at an index is inductively defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Sentence 𝜙 is true in model 𝔐, at index 𝑚/ℎ).
1. For 𝑝 ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑜𝑚, 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝑝 iff 𝑚 ∈ 𝑉 (𝑝);
2. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ ¬𝜙 iff it is not the case that 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙;
3. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙 ∧𝜓 iff 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙 &𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝜓;
4. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝑃𝜙 iff ∃𝑚′(𝑚′ < 𝑚&𝔐,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙);
5. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐹𝜙 iff ∃𝑚′(𝑚 < 𝑚′ &𝑚′ ∈ ℎ&𝔐,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙);
6. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 2𝜙 iff ∀ℎ′(𝑚 ∈ ℎ′ ⇒ 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ′ ⊧ 𝜙).
Importantly, in Ockhamist semantics the truth value of a sentence
is relative to a modal parameter—a history. There is formally nothing
wrong with such a relativization, but it creates an obstacle to the ap-
plication of Ockhamism to its original purpose—analysis of future con-
tingents. Let us take the sentence (S), “There will be a space battle in
the 21st century,” (𝐹𝑝) as used during the NATO 2018 Summit in Brus-
sels. HowshouldweuseOckhamist semantics to evaluate this sentence?
Well, we need to check if it is true at a moment/history pair. So far so
good, but which exact moment and, more importantly, which history
to use? After all, the Brussels Summit has many possible continuations.
And so the trouble begins.
Our Ockhamist semantics gives us a definition of truth at a
context and index (world/time pair) for arbitrary sentences
in our language. But how canwemove from this to the prag-
matically relevant notion of truth at a context?
[6, pp. 207–208]
Thus, to apply Ockhamism, we need to somehow relate the prag-
matically relevant notion of the truth of a sentence used at a particular
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context to the technically relevant notion of the truth of a sentence eval-
uated at a semantic index. I use the symbol ||− to stand for the former
notion of truth, and I use ⊧ to stand for the latter. MacFarlane coined
the term postsemantics to designate the theory whose job is to link the
two notions of truth.
The easiest postsemantics simply identifies the truth at the context
with the truth at the unique semantic index initialized by the context
(we advocated this solution in Wawer and Malpass [12]; it is indepen-
dently defended by Gallina [4]). Nonetheless, many branching theo-
rists reject the easy solution. They argue that the context does designate
a moment, but it does not designate a history [see especially 2, pp. 151–2,
231–3]. In their view, since the act of utterance is a part of many distinct
histories, we cannot distinguish the history in which the utterance takes
place and they conclude that the history parameter is not initialized by
the context of use (see e.g. Belnap et al. [2, pp. 151–152, 163–164, 232–
233]; John MacFarlane [5, p. 232]; [6, p. 208]; Tomasz Placek [9, p. 756];
or Thomas Müller [8, p. 350]). Therefore, they face what I call an ini-
tialization failure. Ockhamist semantics requires that the process of se-
mantic evaluation begins at some specific index, but the context does
not initialize the relevant index.2
Hence, the simple procedure does not work. According tomany the-
orists the context of a sentence is not sufficient to designate the appro-
priate circumstance for the evaluation of the sentence. The content of
the sentence does not seem to do the job either. The meaning of, “There
will be a space battle in the 21st century,” does not indicate which his-
tory is being referred to. However, if neither the context nor the content
initializes a history, then how shall one apply Ockhamist semantics?
Since the immediate route from the truth at a context to the truth at
a semantic index is blocked, the authors need to find another, less direct
way to relate the two notions of truth. Several postsemantic strategies
have been proposed and I shall focus on two of them, both of whose
distinctive feature is that they embrace a relative notion of truth. That
is, I focus on the theories in which the meaning of the sentence supple-
mented by information provided by the context of use is not sufficient
to assess the truth status of a sentence used at the context. According
2I believe that the refusal to accept the history of the context partly results from spe-
cific metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of the branching structure, but I
set this issue aside (the issue is discussed in 12).
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to these theories, the truth value of the sentence is relative to some extra
factor.
2 Assessment relativism
MacFarlane thinks that the relevant additional factor is the context of
assessment. He argues that the truth value of a sentence used at a given
context can be determined only if we also take into account the context
from which the truth value of the sentence is being assessed. A premo-
nition of such an idea can be traced back to [11], in which it is suggested
that:
[R]ather than making formulas true or false with respect
only to the times at which they are true or false, we make
their being true or false relative to subsequent times as well.
[11, p. 268]
The idea was later revived by Nuel Belnap [1] under the name of
“double-time reference.” (However, Belnap used the technique not to
assess the truth value of a sentence, but to provide satisfaction condi-
tions for assertions and other speech acts.) Finally, John MacFarlane
used Belnap’s technical apparatus to formalize the double-relativized
notion of truth in the form of “double-time reference postsemantics” [5,
p. 331]. This postsemantics was later incorporated into a more general
theory of assessment relativism [6].
The formal idea of assessment relativism, as applied to branching,
is that when we assess the truth value of a sentence used at one context
from the perspective of another context, we should check if the sentence
assessed is true at the context of use with respect to the histories passing
through the context of assessment. To state relativist postsemantics, we
need an auxiliary notion of the set of histories passing through a mo-
ment:
Definition 3. 𝐻𝑚 = {ℎ|𝑚 ∈ ℎ}
and the set of histories passing through a pair of moments:
Definition 4. 𝐻𝑚1|𝑚2 =
⎧{
⎨{⎩
𝐻𝑚1 ∩𝐻𝑚2 , if 𝑚1 ≤ 𝑚2,
𝐻𝑚1 , otherwise.
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We can now define assessment relativism as follows
Definition 5. 𝑚𝑢,𝑚𝑎||−𝑅𝜙 iff 𝔐,𝑚𝑢/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙 for every history ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑚𝑢|𝑚𝑎 .
A sentence is true at a pair of contexts 𝑚𝑢,𝑚𝑎 iff it is true at mo-
ment 𝑚𝑢 in all histories passing through 𝑚𝑎 (or all histories passing
through𝑚𝑢 if𝑚𝑢 ≰ 𝑚𝑎). Assessment relativism truly deserves its name,
since the very same sentence used in a single context can be true when
assessed from one perspective, false when assessed from another per-
spective, and neither true nor false when assessed from still another
perspective.






It will be sunny tomorrow.





So, at the pair of contexts 𝑚0 and 𝑚0, the sentence “It will be sunny
tomorrow” is neither true nor false: at 𝑚0,𝑚1 it is true, and at 𝑚0,𝑚2
it is false. MacFarlane is happy with these results as he believes that
the relative truth fits well with our intuitive ascriptions of accuracy to
assertions. He claims that each assertion of a future contingent should
be judged to be inaccurate when assessed from the perspective of the
context of use. Nonetheless, when the flow of time resolves the matter
and confirms the previous prediction (i.e. the context of assessment
changes), then the initial assertion should be judged accurate. Thus,
MacFarlane finds intuitive support for his relative notion of truth.3
3I havemy doubts with regard toMacFarlane’s postsemantic solution, but I set them
aside as I am currently working on a paper focused uniquely on criticism of relativism.
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3 History relativism
History relativism agrees with assessment relativism that the truth sta-
tus of a sentence used in a context cannot be determined based solely on
themeaning of the sentence and the features of the context of use. How-
ever, in history relativism we need to assume the point of view of the
entire history to assess the truth status of a sentence used at a context.
In Richmond Thomason’s words, we are “adopting a whole possible fu-
ture for 𝛼 as our perspective, rather than a single time in the future of
𝛼” [11, p. 269].
Such an attitude is characteristic of Belnap et al. [2]. In their view,
unless a specific possible history is specified, a future contingent cannot
be evaluated at a given context.4 The authors express their attitude in
the following words:
Then the truth of that sentence (given indeterminism) de-
pends not only on the moment at which the sentence is
uttered. It depends in addition on which future course of
events—which history—is being considered. [2, p. 225]
Nonetheless, we noticed that the authors ferociously argue against
the idea that the context indicates which history should be considered
(after all, an utterance is a part of many different courses of events). As
a result, it is simply meaningless to call a future contingent true or false
at the context of its use 𝑚𝑐. As the authors put it:
“𝔐,𝑚𝑐 ⊧ 𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑙 ∶ the coin lands heads” does not make sense.
[2, p. 155]
Only when a continuation of the moment of utterance is indepen-
dently specified can one ask about the truth value of the uttered sen-
tence. Therefore, the history relativists’ answer to the question whether
the sentence “there is going to be a sea battle tomorrow” is true is some-
what evasive. They claim that the sentence is true relative to the contin-
uation in which the sea battle takes place, but it is false relative to the
alternative continuation. This is as much as can be said regarding the
truth value of a sentence at a context.
4Their terminology differs from mine. When I write about a sentence being true at
a context, Belnap et al. [2] write about a stand-alone sentence being true at a context-
initialized point of evaluation.
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We may say that history relativists simply capitulate in face of the
initialization failure. Given the evident indispensability of the history
parameter in Ockhamist semantics, they simply duplicate the history
parameter on the level of postsemantics. We end up with a theory ac-
cording towhich the truth value not only of a sentence-at-index but also
of a sentence-at-context is relative to a history.
Definition 6 (History relativism postsemantics). 𝑚/ℎ||−𝐻𝜙 iff 𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙.
When we apply history relativism to future contingents it becomes
clear that their truth value (at context) is highly arbitrary—it depends
on something as whimsical as an entirely unmotivated choice of a his-
tory parameter. This is a rather controversial consequence. One could
argue that the truth value of a sentence used in a context should be
grounded in something more solid than an ad hoc decision of a seman-
ticist who needs one history or another to do her job.
It is also not entirely clear ofwhat this decision should consist. When
relativists talk in terms of abstract Ockhamist semantics, they say that
a possible future needs to be “posited” [11, p. 271] or “supplied” [2, p.
156]. However, when they try to give a more down-to-earth descrip-
tion of the procedure, they often help themselves with intentional vo-
cabulary. For example, Burgess writes that “The truth value of a future
tense statement depends on which branch we think of as representing
the course of events which is actually going to turn out to happen” [3,
p. 575, emphasis mine] and Müller [8] echoes that “we normally need
to specify which of the equally possible futures we mean to refer to” [8,
p. 354, emphasis mine]. However, if all that is required to specify a pos-
sible history is an intention of a speaker (this procedure is called “inner
baptism in [7]), then making predictions true or false would be all too
easy. Such a procedure has very little in common with everyday usage.
When Themistocles said to Eurybiadeds, “There will be a sea battle to-
morrow,” no one could make this sentence true or false just by thinking
of a specific possible future.5
5Let me note that Belnap et al. [2] have their own ways of domesticating their pro-
posal. Specifically, they argue that the “bare” truth value of a sentence at a context is
irrelevant to the linguistic practice. What really matters in their view is the settled truth
value. They notice that it is often settled that future contingents will have had a settled
truth value and explain how this feature is sufficient to explain linguistic practice. A
sketch of their proposal can be found in [2, sec. 6E]; the view is developed in [1].
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In what follows, I will argue that there is another way to rationalize
history relativism. In my proposal, the truth value of a sentence used
at a context is still relative, but the choice of a specific history is neither
arbitrary nor does it depend on a subject’s intentions. I claim that the
choice of the history becomes well motivated when we understand a
history as a special context of assessment.
4 History relativism as extreme assessment rela-
tivism
In this section, I argue that history relativism can be understood as an ex-
treme version of MacFarlane’s assessment relativism; some inspiration
for this approach can be found in a short passage by Prior:
[T]he Ockhamist seems to treat what is still future in a way
in which it would only be proper to treat what has been
future—he views it as it would be proper to view it from
the end of time. [10, pp. 130–131]
This line of thinking aboutOckhamism seems to have beendiscarded
in the later development of the theory, but it might be used to establish
a new understanding of the history-relative notion of truth. I intend to
develop the idea that when history relativists relativize the truth value
of a sentence at context to a history, they metaphorically situate them-
selves at the transcendent end of the history. Then, they indeed view a
course of events “as it would be proper to view it from the end of time.”
In the spirit of Prior’s philosophy, let me elucidate the insight above
by giving it a formal reconstruction. I intend to apply MacFarlane’s as-
sessment relativism to demonstrate that the notion of truth at a context
relative to a history can be understood as truth at a pair of contexts. We
shall see that—in accordance with Prior’s insight—the context of assess-
ment needs to be situated at the end of time.
Let me begin the investigations with a simple example. Consider
a branching model 𝔐 in which there is a maximal element in every
history—“the end of time”—in this history (there is at most one such
element, given that histories are linearly ordered). If we symbolize the
maximal moment in history ℎ as 𝑚ℎ, it is easy to observe that:
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Lemma 1. If 𝔐 is a model in which there is a maximal element 𝑚ℎ in
every history ℎ, then ∀ℎ(𝐻𝑚ℎ = {ℎ})
Proof. Take an arbitrary history ℎ ∈ 𝔐, 𝑚ℎ ∈ ℎ, so ℎ ∈ 𝐻𝑚ℎ , therefore,
{ℎ} ⊆ 𝐻𝑚ℎ . To prove that 𝐻𝑚ℎ ⊆ {ℎ}, assume for reduction that ∃ℎ′ℎ′ ≠
ℎ&𝑚ℎ ∈ ℎ′. Since ℎ ≠ ℎ′, ∃𝑚′∈ℎ′𝑚′ ∈ ℎ′ &𝑚′ ∉ ℎ. As 𝑚ℎ,𝑚′ ∈ ℎ′ and ℎ′
is linearly ordered, there are two options:
1. If 𝑚′ < 𝑚ℎ, then (by no-backward-branching and maximality of
ℎ) 𝑚′ ∈ ℎ, which contradicts our assumption.
2. If 𝑚ℎ ≤ 𝑚′, then (since 𝑚ℎ is the maximal element of ℎ and ℎ is a
maximal, linearly ordered subset of 𝑀) 𝑚ℎ ≮ 𝑚′. Thus, 𝑚′ = 𝑚ℎ,
but then 𝑚′ ∈ ℎ, which contradicts our assumption.
A simple proof is sufficient to establish that for any 𝑚 in model 𝔐
described above, a sentence is true relative to a history ℎ iff it is assessed
as true from the perspective of moment 𝑚ℎ, i.e. from the end of time in
history ℎ:
Fact 1. 𝑚/ℎ ||−𝐻𝜙 iff 𝑚,𝑚ℎ||−𝑅𝜙
Proof. Since 𝑚,𝑚ℎ ∈ ℎ and 𝑚ℎ is themaximal element of ℎ, then 𝑚 ≤ 𝑚ℎ.
From this we can conclude that 𝐻𝑚|𝑚ℎ = (𝐻𝑚 ∩ 𝐻𝑚ℎ) = 𝐻𝑚ℎ . Hence,
𝐻𝑚|𝑚ℎ = 𝐻𝑚ℎ . By lemma 1, 𝐻𝑚ℎ = {ℎ}. Therefore, 𝐻𝑚|𝑚ℎ = {ℎ}.
1. 𝑚,𝑚ℎ||−𝑅𝜙 iff
2. 𝑚/ℎ′ ⊧ 𝜙, for every ℎ′ ∈ 𝐻𝑚|𝑚ℎ iff (since 𝐻𝑚|𝑚ℎ = {ℎ})
3. 𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙 iff (by def. 6)
4. 𝑚/ℎ||−𝐻𝜙.
Thus, in the “upper-bounded”model it is easy to substantiate Prior’s
claim; however, application ofOckhamism is not limited to suchmodels.
It might well be that some (or even all) of the histories in a model have
no end. In such a case, what would it mean for an Ockhamist to view
the future “as it would be proper to view it from the end of time?” I
propose to read it along the following lines: an Ockhamist views the
future as it would be proper to view it from a transcendent end of time.
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To give formalmeaning to themaxim, I construct what I call a dooms-
day extension of a branching model. Let 𝔐 ≔ ⟨𝑀,<⟩ be a branching
model. We extend the model 𝔐 with a set 𝑀𝐷 such that:
(i) ∀ℎ∃!𝑚ℎ∈𝑀𝐷∀𝑚∈ℎ𝑚 < 𝑚ℎ
(ii) ∀𝑚ℎ∈𝑀𝐷∃!ℎ∀𝑚∈ℎ(𝑚 < 𝑚ℎ ⇔ 𝑚 ∈ ℎ)
This means that we attach a single extra moment on top of every
history in the original model 𝔐. I will call such an extended structure
𝔐𝔇, and 𝑚ℎ is the moment which is attached on top of history ℎ. Let
me pause to show that model 𝔐𝔇 is still a model of branching. Its or-
dering relation is evidently a partial order, so let me just check if it is a
connected order without backward branching.
Fact 2 (𝔐𝐷 is a 𝐵𝑇 model).
Connectedness ∀𝑚,𝑛∈𝑀∃𝑜∈𝑀𝑜 ≤ 𝑚&𝑜 ≤ 𝑛
Proof. The only interesting case is when we pick 𝑚ℎ1 ,𝑚ℎ2 ∈ 𝑀𝐷.
In this case, we just need to choose anymoment 𝑚 ∈ ℎ1 and 𝑛 ∈ ℎ2.
By definition of 𝔐𝔇, 𝑚 < 𝑚ℎ1 and 𝑛 < 𝑚ℎ2 , and since 𝑚 and 𝑛 are
connected and ≤ is transitive, 𝑚ℎ1 and 𝑚ℎ2 are also connected.
No-Backward-Branching
∀𝑚1,𝑚2,𝑚3(𝑚1 ≤ 𝑚3 &𝑚2 ≤ 𝑚3) ⇒ (𝑚1 ≤ 𝑚2 ∨𝑚2 ≤ 𝑚1)
Proof. We just need to check if it is satisfied for every 𝑚3 = 𝑚ℎ ∈
𝑀𝐷. Take an arbitrary 𝑚ℎ ∈ 𝑀𝐷, then by condition (ii) we have
that all the moments below 𝑚ℎ are in a single history. And since
every history is linearly ordered, there is no danger of backward
branching.
Before I proceed, let me observe that the construction of 𝔐𝔇 guaran-
tees that there is a maximal element in every history. Therefore, lemma
1 applies, and we have that in 𝔐𝔇, ∀ℎ𝐻𝑚ℎ = {ℎ}.
Let us investigate the relations between history relativism and as-
sessment relativism in the doomsday model.
397
Observe first that there is 𝔐 and 𝜙 such that:
𝔐,𝑚/ℎ||−𝐻𝜙 & 𝔐𝔇,𝑚,𝑚ℎ||−/𝑅𝜙
There are two kinds of reasons for the failure.
“Material” There may be 𝜙 which is false everywhere in ℎ, but true at
𝑚ℎ. (“Four horsemen of the Apocalypse are riding their horses”
is a good candidate for 𝜙). Then 𝐺¬𝑝 is true at anymoment in ℎ in
the base model, but false in the doomsday extension of the model.
“Structural” The addition of doomsday significantlymodifies the struc-
ture of the histories. Most evidently, seriality no longer holds and
thus 𝐺𝜙 → 𝐹𝜙 is not valid in the extended model.
It is then a valid questionwhetherwe can give formal credit to Prior’s
insight in the general case. I propose a relatively easy solution: limit the
range of the future operator such that it does not reach all the way to
doomsday. In this sense, doomsday is truly a transcendent end of time
as it cannot be reached by the “mundane” future operator. The new
definition of 𝐹 in the doomsday model should be modified as follows:
Definition 7.
𝔐𝔇,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐹𝜙 iff ∃𝑚′(𝑚′ ∈ ℎ&𝑚′ > 𝑚&𝑚′ ≠ 𝑚ℎ &𝔐𝔇,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙).
By the duality of 𝐹 and 𝐺, we obtain that
𝔐𝔇,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐺𝜙 iff ∀𝑚′(𝑚′ ∈ ℎ&𝑚′ > 𝑚&𝑚′ ≠ 𝑚ℎ) ⇒ 𝔐𝔇,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙.
Therefore, we end up with a model which has an extra element on
top of every history, but the element is not attainable by the connective
“it will be the case that.” So, doomsday is in one sense at the end of
time, but in another it is outside of time. I am not sufficiently versed
in theology to give a convincing account of this idea, but I am quite
confident that it has been entertained at some point in the history of
human thought. Importantly for us, this modification makes it possible
to prove an analogue of fact 1 in full generality:
Fact 3. Let 𝔐 be an arbitrary branching model and 𝔐𝔇 its doomsday
extension, and let 𝑚 ∈ 𝔐, then:
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𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ||−𝐻𝜙 iff 𝔐𝔇,𝑚,𝑚ℎ ||−𝑅𝜙
Proof. By induction on complexity of 𝜙, in particular:
1. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ||−𝐻𝐹𝜙 if (by def. 6)
2. 𝔐,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐹𝜙 iff (by def. of 𝐹)
3. ∃𝑚′|𝑚′∈ℎ&𝑚′>𝑚𝔐,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙 iff (by def. 6)
4. ∃𝑚′|𝑚′∈ℎ&𝑚′>𝑚𝔐,𝑚′/ℎ ||−𝐻𝜙 iff (by inductive assumption)
5. ∃𝑚′|𝑚′∈ℎ&𝑚′>𝑚𝔐𝔇,𝑚′,𝑚ℎ||−𝑅𝜙 iff (by def. 5)
6. ∃𝑚′|𝑚′∈ℎ&𝑚′>𝑚∀ℎ′∈𝐻𝑚′|𝑚ℎ 𝔐
𝔇,𝑚′/ℎ′ ⊧ 𝜙 iff (since 𝑚′ < 𝑚ℎ, by
def. 4)
7. ∃𝑚′|𝑚′∈ℎ&𝑚′>𝑚∀ℎ′∈𝐻𝑚ℎ 𝔐
𝔇,𝑚′/ℎ′ ⊧ 𝜙 iff (by Lemma 1)
8. ∃𝑚′|𝑚′∈ℎ&𝑚′>𝑚𝔐𝔇,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙 iff (𝑚′ ∈ ℎ, so 𝑚′ ≠ 𝑚ℎ)
9. ∃𝑚′(𝑚′ ∈ ℎ&𝑚′ > 𝑚&𝑚′ ≠ 𝑚ℎ &𝔐𝔇,𝑚′/ℎ ⊧ 𝜙) iff (by def. 7)
10. 𝔐𝔇,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐹𝜙 iff (by Lemma 1)
11. ∀ℎ∈𝐻𝑚ℎ 𝔐
𝔇,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐹𝜙 iff (since 𝑚 < 𝑚ℎ, by def. 4)
12. ∀ℎ∈𝐻𝑚|𝑚ℎ 𝔐
𝔇,𝑚/ℎ ⊧ 𝐹𝜙 iff (be def. 5)
13. 𝔐𝔇,𝑚,𝑚ℎ||−𝑅𝐹𝜙
Thanks to the modification of the truth clause of 𝐹 in the doomsday
model, we can give full credit to Prior’s insight. The Ockhamist looks
at the future as if it has been future, that is, from the perspective of the
end of time. A necessary addition to vindicate this insight is that in the
models in which time has no end, the end of time is “beyond time.”
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